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I. UTAH LAW REQUIRES THE EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT OF 
THE PARTIES FOR THE TRIAL OF ISSUES NOT RAISED IN THE 
PLEADINGS. 
In response to the Appellants' (Laura Fluhman, Paige Parsons, and Sidney Laken 
Fluhman - hereinafter referred to collectively as the Fluhmans) first argument contained in 
their initial brief on appeal1, Appellee, Timothy Sanchez (Sanchez) essentially argues that 
because the Fluhmans were able to present a defense at trial, they were on sufficient notice 
regarding the nature of the trial before the district court and Sanchez's claims. In support, 
Sanchez references a motion for summary judgement filed with the trial court by the 
Fluhmans. Sanchez Response Brief Page 24. 
In fact, Fluhmans did not make a motion for summaryjudgement. The Fluhmans' 
trial attorney, Keith Eddington, filed a motion to dismiss Sanchez's complaint. In his written 
response to the motion to dismiss filed by Mr. Eddington, Sanchez referred to the motion 
as a motion for summary judgement and that reference appears to have created some 
confusion. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court initiated a discussion with Mr. 
Eddington regarding whether the Fluhmans' motion was a motion to dismiss or a motion for 
summaryjudgement. Mr. Eddington and the court agreed the motion was appropriately filed 
as a motion to dismiss and the parties agreed that it would be heard as such. Motion to 
Dismiss Hearing Transcript Page 2. 
1
 This Court Should Overturn the Trial Court's Decision Based on its Failure to Protect the 
Fluhmans' Due Process Rights to Notice. Brief of Appellants, Page 9. 
1 
The distinction between whether the Fluhmans filed a motion to dismiss versus one 
for summary judgement is important for two reasons. First, it further illustrates the 
confusion surrounding this case from its outset regarding the basis for Sanchez's complaint 
and prayer for relief. Second, the basis for the motion to dismiss was, regardless of the 
underlying facts, Sanchez's complaint failed to state a cause of action for which relief could 
be granted. Mr. Eddington argued the complaint was a suit to set aside the adoption based 
on fraud and that Utah law specifically foreclosed setting aside adoptions based on 
allegations of fraud. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.15(2). The trial court denied the motion to dismiss 
on the basis that it preferred to hear Sanchez's evidence at trial. Motion to Dismiss Hearing 
Transcript. Page 21 -22. 
Nothing in the trial court's decision or subsequent pleadings filed by the parties prior 
to trial, amended or modified the basic claims raised in Sanchez's complaint. At trial, prior 
to commencement of testimony, Mr. Eddington reiterated the Fluhmans' position that 
Sanchez's complaint was based on fraud and by statute, fraud could not be the basis for 
setting aside the adoption. Trial Transcript Pages 7-10. 
Conversely, while Sanchez continues to maintain the adoption was a "Sham" 
(Sanchez Response Brief. Page 2 R at trial, after a question and answer session with the 
court, Sanchez abandoned claims based on fraud and argued the case should be decided 
based on the Fluhmans' alleged failure to comply with notice requirements under Utah 
adoption law. Trial Transcript Pages 221 - 223. 
2 
In Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998) the court addressed the issue of 
amending pleadings at trial At the conclusion of the trial, Archuleta attempted to amend 
her causes of action to include a claim for breach of contract. The trial court denied 
Archuleta's motion and on appeal the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. Id. at 411. 
In reaching its decision, the Archuleta court recognized issues relevant to Fluhmans' 
appeal. First, the court recognized there must "be either express or implied consent of the 
parties for the trial of issues not raised in the pleadings." Id. at 412. The court further noted, 
even though the defendant in Archuleta recognized Archuleta *s claims involved issues of 
contract interpretation, such recognition was insufficient basis for allowing Archuleta to 
amend, at the close of the trial, the causes of action for which relief could be granted. Id at. 
412. Under Archuleta, the mere fact a party recognizes an issue is not the same as providing 
notice to a party regarding the claims that will be adjudicated. 
Finally, the court noted, even though the Archuleta defendant referenced an 
underlying agreement during the course of the trial, the references were in the context of 
defending against Archuleta's claims of fraud and not in the context of breach of contract. 
The court concluded that it was not appropriate to inadvertently conduct a trial on issues not 
raised in the pleadings. Id. at 413. 
In the case before this court, the Fluhmans were forced to defend against claims not 
raised in the pleadings. The Fluhmans' attorney consistently argued the claims and evidence 
marshaled by Sanchez did not support allegations of fraud raised in the pretrial pleadings. 
3 
Sanchez's causes of action based on fraud, were the only allegations presented to the court 
at the time of trial. However, during the course of the trial, the court altered the nature of 
Sanchez's claim and prayer for relief to reflect allegations that the adoption of Sidney Laken 
Fluhman (Sidney) by Paige Parsons (Parsons) failed to comply with the requirements of 
Utah Adoption Law, specifically U.CA. § 78-30-4.13 with regard to notice. Trial 
Transcript. Page 255. 
The Fluhmans were not prepared for the trial court's decision to alter the nature of 
the proceedings and causes of action before the court. The trial court committed error, and 
this court should overturn the ruling or remand the case for retrial. 
IL AN UNMARRIED, BIOLOGICAL FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS 
ACQUIRE CONSTITUTIONAL AND DUE PROCESS PROTECTION 
ONLY AFTER THE FATHER COMPLIES WITH THE STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING LEGAL PATERNITY, 
la Adoption of B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999) the Utah Supreme Court clarified 
the issue of when constitutional and due process protections attach to an unmarried, 
biological father's parental rights with respect to a child born out of wedlock. In B.B.D., the 
parents of B.B.D. (Baby Boy Doe) were engaged in a sexual relationship. The infant's 
mother (Identified as K.D.) and father (Identified as C.F.) were residents of the state of 
Washington. Prior to B.B.D.'s birth, K.D. moved to Utah. K.D. informed C.F. that she was 
moving to Utah with the intent of placing B.B.D. for adoption. C.F. consistently expressed 
his opposition to the adoption and attempted to establish paternity by registering with the 
4 
Washington Division of Social and Health Services. However, his first attempt to so register 
was denied because the baby was not yet bom. LI at 969. 
After B.B.D.'s birth, C.F. tried to establish paternity in Washington. However, he 
was informed he would not be able to do so because the baby was in Utah. C.F. did not 
attempt to file for paternity in Utah. However, he tried to assert and contest B.B.D.'s 
adoption by filing a letter of opposition with the district court where the adoption was taking 
place and by filing an "Answer and Counterclaim" for custody of B.B.D along with other 
subsequent pleadings. Id at 969, 970. 
The district court ruled that C.F. failed to follow the statutory scheme for establishing 
paternity and found he had no legal standing to contest the adoption. On appeal C.F. 
contended the court's ruling violated his constitutional and due process rights as ths 
biological father of B.B.D. Id at 970. 
In affirming the district court's decision and holding that C.F. forfeited his parental 
rights, the Utah Supreme Court noted: "While it is true that the relationship between a parent 
and child is afforded some protection by the federal and state constitutions,...the rights of 
parents are commensurate with the responsibilities they have assumed, and in the case of 
unmarried fathers, a biological relationship alone is insufficient to establish constitutionally 
protected parental rights." Id. at 970. 
In reaching its decision in B B.D., the Supreme Court quoted Utah's statute applicable 
to that case and the appeal currently before this court: "Under Utah law, "an unmarried 
5 
biological father has an inchoate interest that acquires constitutional protection only when 
he demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood, both 
during pregnancy and upon the child's birth." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(2)(e) (1996). 
An unmarried father demonstrates his commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood "by 
providing appropriate medical and financial support, and by establishing legal paternity, in 
accordance with the requirements of [Utah law]," IcL (emphasis added). If an unmarried 
father fails to adhere to these requirements, including taking the necessary steps to establish 
paternity, "his biological parental interest may be lost entirely or greatly diminished in 
constitutional significance by his failure to timely exercise it, or by his failure to strictly 
comply with the available legal steps to substantiate it" IcL § 78-30-4.12(3)(b) (emphasis 
added)." Id at 970. 
The court addressed C.F.'s due process claim in similar fashion noting: "C.F. 
contends that section 78-30-4.13 denied him due process of law because he had no 
opportunity to object to his biological child's adoption proceeding. This contention lacks 
merit and has been thoroughly addressed in existing case law." Id. at 970. The court went 
on to review applicable case and statutory law supporting its decision and held that by 
failing to take necessary steps to establish legal paternity, C.F. waived his right to notice and 
consent. Id. at 971. 
The importance of the decision in B.B.D. to this appeal is the supreme court's refusal 
to legitimize incremental parental rights and its implicit recognition that Utah's adoption 
6 
statutes (including U.C. A. § § 78-2 0-4.12 through 4.15) pass constitutional muster. In order 
to establish parental rights, the court held an unmarried, biological father has to strictly 
comply with all of the requirements created by Utah's statutes. Id. at 970. 
B.B.D. completely undermines Sanchez's basic argument, which is, even though he 
[Sanchez] did not comply with the statutory requirements for asserting legal paternity, he did 
enough through payment of some child support and through his involvement with Sidney 
to create an implication of something akin to legal paternity. Sanchez claims, in his case, 
the court should hold the clear statutory language does not apply. Sanchez argues, because 
he may have met some of the requirements necessary to establish legal paternity, he should 
have had the opportunity to consent to Sidney's adoption by Parsons. 
Sanchez references this court's decision in the Matter of K.B.E., 740 P.2d 292 (Utah 
App. 1997) and cites Justice Jackson's concurring opinion. However, the majority decision 
in K.B.E. specifically rejected Justice Jackson's argument, stating: "The concurring opinion 
of Judge Jackson concludes to the contrary, that § 78-3-4(3) does not apply to situations 
where the mother of the child maintains custody of the child and where the only potential 
adoption proceeding concerns who will be a co-parent with her....We believe that reasoning 
to be inconsistent with the language of the statute and fraught with potential for pitfalls." 
Id at 296. 
Later this court went on to state: "Furthermore, the statute does not contain 
exclusionary language to demonstrate a legislative intent to exempt stepfather adoptions 
7 
from its coverage. This Court should not substitute its judgement for that of the legislature 
when it is not necessary to do so." M. at 297. 
Sanchez's position is not supported by this court's decision in K.B.E., or by the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in B.3.D. The Utah Supreme Court clearly and unequivocally 
held that an unmarried, biological father's right to notice and consent, with regard to an 
adoption, hinges on the establishment of legal paternity. The court further held that 
constitutional and due process rights only attach upon compliance with the legal process for 
establishing paternity. 
The simple fact is, prior to the trial court's decision to reopen Sidney's adoption, 
Sanchez did not establish legal paternity with regard to Sidney. Sanchez didn't even bother 
to contest the adoption until more than half a year after he was informed by the Fluhmans 
the adoption had taken place. By failing to establish legal paternity, under B.B.D. and 
Utah's adoption statutes, Sanchez waived any constitutional and due process rights he might 
have otherwise acquired with regard to an opportunity for notice and the right to consent to 
Sidney's adoption. 
III. CLARIFICATION OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, 
On page 1 of Sanchez's response brief, under the heading, "Statement of Issues 
Presented on Appeal," he argues there is only one issue before this court on appeal. That 
issue is whether or not Sidney's adoption was perfected as to Sanchez. 
8 
For clarification, Fluhmans assert this appeal includes several claims, any one cf 
which, if granted, would be the basis for modifying the trial court's decision. In order those 
claims are as follows: 
I. This Court Should Overturn the Trial Court's Decision Based on its Failure to 
Protect the Fluhmans' Due Process Rights to Notice. The basis for this claim, as forth in 
Fluhmans' appeal brief (argument I.) and this reply (argument I.), is Sanchez's complaint 
and subsequent pleadings failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be 
granted. At trial, the court erred in allowing Sanchez to incorporate a claim for relief based 
on the Fluhmans' alleged failure to provide notice regarding Sidney's adoption. The trial 
court's process for incorporating a new claim for relief denied Fluhmans their due process 
right to notice regarding issues to be adjudicated at trial, and therefore constitutes reversible 
error. 
II. The trial court erred in concluding that Sidney was placed for adoption, within 
the meaning ofU.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(1) and (2)(a), when she was at least six months old. 
The basis for this claim, as set forch in Fluhmans' appeals brief (arguments II. and III.) and 
this reply (argument IL), is that in April 1997, when Sidney was approximately one month 
old, her mother Laura Fluhman (Laura), executed a consent to adopt in favor of Parsons. 
Subsequently Parsons, through her attorney Keith Eddington, filed an adoption petition in 
the Utah Third District Court. The execution of Laura's consent to adopt and Parsons' filing 
of the adoption petition represents verifiable proof that Sidney was placed for adoption 
before she was six months old. 
9 
The significance of this claim is, where Sidney was placed for adoption before she 
was six months old, Fluhmans were not required to provide Sanchez with notice of the 
adoption proceeding unless and until he established legal paternity. Sanchez did not 
establish legal paternity until after the trial court's decision to set aside the adoption. 
Because Sidney was placed for adoption before she was six months old, the trial court erred 
in finding Sanchez was entitled to notice of the adoption and an opportunity to consent. 
III. Even if this court finds Sidney was placed for adoption after she was six months 
old, U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(4) provides a statutory alternative to obtaining the consent of an 
unmarried father. The basis for this claim, as set forth in the Fluhmans' appeal brief 
(argument IV.), is the referenced statute. If an adoptive child is more than six months old, 
a petitioner can meet the statutory requirements for perfecting an adoption, without notice 
to the biological father, by: "[filing] with the court a certificate from the state registrar of 
vital statistics within the Department of Health, stating that a diligent search has been made 
of the registry of notices from unmarried biological fathers described in Subsection 
(2)(b)(ii)t and that no filing has been found pertaining to the father of the child in question, 
or if a filing is found, stating the name of the putative father and the time and date of filing. 
That certificate shall be filed with the court prior to entrance of a final decree of adoption." 
Id. 
10 
During the course of Sidney' s adoption, Parsons completed and filed three certificates 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-30-4.14(4). Compliance with U.C.A. §78-30-4.14(4) obviated the 
notice and consent requirements of U.C.A. §78-30-4.13 and 4.14. On this basis, the trial 
court committed reversible error in reopening Sidney's adoption. 
IV. Finally, under U. C.A. §78-30-4.16 the trial court erred in allowing Sanchez to 
contest an adoption after entry of the final decree. The basis for this claim, as set forth Li 
Fluhmans' appeal brief (argument V.), is the referenced statute. U.C.A. §78-30-4.16(1) 
defines the remedies available to a party contesting an adoption, including those available 
to a party entitled to notice and consent under "the provision of this chapter..." Id. U.C.A. 
§78-30-4.16(3) expressly limits the time period for contesting an adoption. Subsection 3 
states: 
An adoption may not be contested after the final decree of adoption is entered. 
Sidney's adoption by Parsons was finalized 9 February 1998. At trial, Sanchez 
testified Laura told him in February 1998 that Parsons adopted Sidney. (Trial transcript. 
page 40. lines 2-11.) However, Sanchez waited more than six months to file his complaim. 




Throughout this case, Sanchez has consistently argued that Parsons' adoption cf 
Sidney was somehow a sham. Even in his response to Fluhmans' appeal, Sanchez 
references this allegation, despite the fact - for whatever reason, he abandoned his fraud 
claims at trial. Sanchez response brief pages 22 and 27. Further, the trial court did not 
find, nor was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the underlying allegations 
of fraud contained in Sanchez's complaint. 
Sanchez also makes the unsupported allegation that "Sidney would benefit a great 
deal in having a father which would be in her best interests which best interest should 
count....Both Appellee and Sidney would be able to continue to develop their relationship 
and bond as parent and child. Sidney will benefit from future support, nurturing and 
guidance provided by her natural father/' Id. at 22. In addition, Sanchez takes a very moral 
position with the following statement: "He [Sanchez] has never denied his paternity nor 
shirked his parental responsibilities." Id. at 22. 
It is evident, in the trial transcript, these arguments found favor with the trial court. 
The transcript records the court's concern regarding the affect the adoption had in cutting 
off Sanchez's parental rights wheie he [Sanchez] exhibited a desire to be a father to Sidney. 
Trial Transcript Page 225. 
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However credible Sanchez's moral posturing and the trial court's concerns may be 
in general, that credibility is lost when applied to the specific facts of this case. The hard 
truth is, Sidney was conceived during the course of an illicit affair between Laura and 
Sanchez, the married father of two other minor children. Sanchez's statement that he has 
never "shirked his parental responsibilities" is difficult to square with the fact he engaged 
in an adulterous affair. While Laura and Sidney were in the hospital after Sidney's birth, 
Sanchez went on vacation. Trial Transcript, Page 60. This is said not as an indictment of 
Sanchez, but to illustrate his conduct was not that of a committed parent. 
Prior to Sidney's birth, bcth Sanchez and Laura realized their relationship was a 
mistake. They did not intend to marry or live together for the purpose of raising Sidney. kL 
at 56 and 57. Laura even refused to reference Sanchez on Sidney's birth certificate, id. at 
58. 
Sanchez never represented an ability during the course of his relationship with Laura 
or prior to Sidney's adoption, to take custody of Sidney and raise her as his daughter. This 
is important again, not as a condemnation of Sanchez, but as a rebuttal to his moralistic 
claims that he is only looking out for Sidney's best interests. 
In fact, Laura was faced v/ith the sole responsibility of looking out for Sidney's best 
interests. From the outset, she realized her ability to provide for Sidney's health and 
welfare was limited by the constraints on her own health, as result of diabetes. And shs 
couldn't look to Sanchez for the support she needed. 
13 
With regard to the ability of either Laura or Sanchez to provide financially for 
Sidney's care and welfare, Sanchez references the fact that he made several monthly child 
support payments. Sanchez response brief. Page 9. But the truth is the amount he paid, 
$165 to $175 per month, is barely sufficient to keep an infant in clean diapers and T-shirts. 
The support Sanchez was able to provide did not come near the cost of providing food, 
shelter and other life necessities for an infant. Additionally, following Sidney's birth, 
Sanchez and his wife were divorced and for a time he lived with friends. Under the 
circumstances, he was not in a position to support another family. 
Faced with the reality of her own situation and that of Sanchez, Laura committed to 
a responsible course of action to protect Sidney's best interests. Sidney's adoption by 
Parsons provided the infant with a permanent home, a stable family, and income to support 
her care and welfare. As a school teacher, Parsons and Sidney are covered by favorable 
health insurance and as Parsons' daughter, Sidney is covered by the benefit of Parsons' life 
insurance and other fringe benefits obtained through her work. 
Simply put and contrary to Sanchez's assertions (Sanchez response brief. Page 21 \ 
the state has a very strong interest in ensuring that Sidney, as an adoptive child, has the 
benefit of a stable and permanent home under U.C.A.§ 78-30-4.12. 
This court's decision in Ma tter ofK.B.E., supra at 296, and the Utah Supreme Court's 
decision in Adoption ofB.B.D., supra at 971, recognize the fundamental principle that Utah 
adoption law does not distinguish between agency placement adoptions and adoptions such 
14 
as Sidney's. Accordingly, the Fluhmans are entitled to the same protections afforded other 
adoptive families under Utah law. 
In crafting a decision outside the boundaries established by the Utah legislature for 
determining whether Sanchez was entitled to notice and whether the adoption could be set 
aside, the trial court erred. The Fluhmans request this court set aside the trial court's 
decision and enter judgement in their favor, as requested herein. 
DATED this day of January, 2001. 
RANDLE, DEAMER, McCONKIE & LEE 
Kathleen McConkie 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Motion to Dismiss Hearing Transcript Pages 
Page 2 
Pages 21 -22 
1 FEBRUARY 10, 1999 
2 THE COURT: THIS IS THE TIME FOR THE HEARING ON 
3 MOTION TO DISMISS HEARING IN THE CASE OF TIMOTHY D. SANCHEZ 
4 VERSUS LAURA FLUHMAN, PAIGE PARSONS, SIDNEY LAKEN FLUHMAN. 
5 ARE THE PARTIES READY TO PROCEED. I BELIEVE IT'S THE 
6 DEFENDANT'S MOTION; IS THAT CORRECT? 
7 MR. EDDINGTON: THAT'S CORRECT. 
8 THE COURT: AND I'VE READ THE MATERIALS AND I GUESS 
9 THERE IS A COUPLE OF THINGS BEFORE WE START. I MEAN, THE 
10 DEFENDANT'S MOTION IS CALLED MOTION TO DISMISS. MR. LUDLOW 
11 TALKS ABOUT SUMMARY JUDGMENT ALL THROUGH HIS THINGS. SO DO 
12 WE HAVE A MOTION TO DISMISS OR A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
13 MR. EDDINGTON: WE FILED IT AS A MOTION TO DISMISS. 
14 THAT WAS THE ORIGINAL BASIS OF IT. 
15 THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT I THINK IS RIGHT. IT IS A 
16 MOTION TO DISMISS BECAUSE YOUR MOTION DOESN'T COMPLY WITH 
17 THE RULE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ABOUT SETTING FORTH THE FACTS, 
18 CITATIONS TO THE RECORD, ET CETERA. THAT RAISES ANOTHER 
19 QUESTION, YOU KNOW, FOR ME AND THAT SIMPLY WHETHER IS THIS 
2 0 IS A -- IF IT'S A MOTION TO DISMISS, WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS 
21 WE'RE GOING TO TAKE THE COMPLAINT AND UNDER ANY SET OF FACTS 
22 IT COULD BE STATED FROM THE COMPLAINT, WHETHER THAT STATES A 
23 CLAIM. IS THAT -- OKAY. WELL THEN, GO AHEAD. 
24 MR. EDDINGTON: FIRST OF ALL, I DON'T KNOW HOW MUCH 
25 BACKGROUND THE COURT WANTS WITH REGARDS TO THE FACTS. I 
21 
ONCE A PETITIONER HAS RECEIVED THE ADOPTEE IN HIS HOME AND 
THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION HAS BEEN FILED, THE PETITIONER IS 
ENTITLED TO CUSTODY." THAT OCCURRED ON APRIL 21ST OF '97, 
EIGHTEEN MONTHS BEFORE HE BRINGS THIS ACTION. CUSTODY 
TRANSFERRED BY STATUTE. AND I JUST THINK THAT FOR HIM TO DO 
IT NOW IS SIMPLY A BAD FAITH CLAIM. 
THE COURT: WELL, YOU KNOW, UNTIL I KNOW ALL THE 
FACTS I CAN'T EVEN DETERMINE THAT. YOU KNOW, I MEAN, I CAN 
UNDERSTAND PEOPLE SAY THAT MOTIVATIONS OF PEOPLE TO BRING 
LAWSUITS CAN BE BAD FAITH BECAUSE IF YOU SAY, I KNOW -- YOU 
AS AN ATTORNEY KNOW THE FACTS AS YOU THINK THEY ARE. BUT 
YOU KNOW, ALL I KNOW IS THAT YOU SAY ONE THING AND THEY 
SAY THE OTHER AND IT'S VERY, VERY DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE THAT. 
MY CONCERN, I DON'T CARE IN TERMS OF MAKING TOUGH DECISIONS 
WHETHER THEY ARE GOING TO BE OVERRULED OR NOT, BUT I DON'T 
WANT TO MAKE A DECISION SAYING THAT HEY, WE HAVE A SUPREME 
COURT DECISION THAT THE PLAINTIFF CITED THAT SAYS WHAT IT 
SAYS AND YOU DIDN'T FOLLOW IT. AND MY CONCERN RIGHT NOW IS 
THAT I DON'T WANT TO HAVE THIS LAST FOREVER. AND I'M MORE 
THAN HAPPY TO SAY, WHAT DO WE NEED TO DO TO RESOLVE THIS 
ISSUE. AND IF IF HAS TO GET IT DONE IN A MONTH OR TWO, I'M 
MORE THAN HAPPY TO DO IT BECAUSE I DON'T WANT TO MAKE IT GO 
LONGER. BUT THE OTHER THING I'M NOT GOING TO DO IS I'M NOT 
GOING TO GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS TODAY. I'M GOING TO 
DENY IT ON THE BASIS THAT I THINK, YOU KNOW, THE FACTS AS 
22 
ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT, YOU KNOW, ALTHOUGH, YOU KNOW, 
IT'S NOT EVERYTHING THAT THAT IN RE: BABY DOE CASE SAYS, 
IT'S ENOUGH THAT I DON'T FEEL GOOD ABOUT DISMISSING THE CASE 
AT THE OUTSET OF IT. 
HAVING SAID THAT, I WANT TO KNOW RIGHT NOW HOW LONG AND 
WHAT DISCOVERY. MR. LUDLOW, DO YOU HAVE TO DO ANY 
DISCOVERY? MR. EDDINGTON? 
MR. EDDINGTON: I HAVE NONE, NO. 
THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU NEED TO DO, MR. LUDLOW? 
I'M NOT GOING TOLD THIS -- WE'RE NOT GOING TO TAKE 12 MONTHS 
TO DO DISCOVERY. 
MR. LUDLOW: I AGREE, YOUR HONOR. I CAN HAVE IT 
DONE. I PLAN TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION OF BOTH THE DEFENDANTS. 
THE COURT: PARDON. 
MR. LUDLOW: I PLAN TO TAKE THE DEPOSITION OF BOTH 
THE DEFENDANTS. 
THE COURT: THIS IS THE MOTHER OF THE CHILD AND THE 
GRANDMOTHER. 
MR. LUDLOW: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: WHEN CAN THAT BE DONE. 
MR. LUDLOW: YOUR HONOR, I WOULD HAVE TO ASK THE 
COURT FOR THE -- I'VE GOT THREE FEDERAL TRIALS THAT ARE 
COMING UP IN A ROW. I CAN DO THAT IN THE MIDDLE OF MARCH. 
I CAN'T DO IT --
THE COURT: WELL, OKAY. OTHER THAN THOSE 
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1 SOMEBODY SHOWED ME SOME OF THOSE OTHER THINGS IN THE LAST 
2 HEARING THAT WE HAD ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS. I HAVE YET TO 
3 SEE SOMETHING ABOUT ANY ADOPTION PAPER IN THIS CASE. AND SO 
4 THAT MIGHT BE A REALLY GOOD IDEA IF THAT'S THE POSITION YOU 
5 ARE TAKING TO GIVE ME THOSE PAPERS BECAUSE ABSENT YOU 
6 SAYING THAT 15 SECONDS AGO, I'VE NEVER HEARD THAT. 
7 MR. EDDINGTON: OKAY. DO YOU WANT THEM NOW OR DO 
8 YOU WANT THEM AS WE GO THROUGH THE ARGUMENT. 
9 THE COURT: YOU CAN DO THEM WHEN YOU GO THROUGH 
10 THE CASE. 
11 MR. EDDINGTON: OKAY. ASIDE FROM THAT, WE'RE STILL 
12 OF THE POSITION THAT PLAINTIFF DOESN'T HAVE A STANDING TO 
13 SUE BASED ON HIS LACK OF COMPLIANCE INITIALLY. 
14 THE COURT: WITH 2 (A) OR 2 (B) 
15 MR. EDDINGTON: WELL, WITH EITHER ONE. BASED ON 4 
16 15 FRAUD IS NO DEFENSE AND SPECIFICALLY OUTLINES. THAT'S 
17 THE CRUX OF HIS CASE IS THERE WAS FRAUD HERE. EVEN IF THERE 
18 WAS FRAUD -- WHICH WE'RE NOT CONCEDING -- BUT EVEN IF THERE 
19 WAS THAT IS NOT GROUNDS TO OVERTURN THE ADOPTION. IF WE'RE 
2 0 HERE TODAY TO DEAL WITH THE FRAUD, THAT'S ONE THING. IF 
21 WE'RE HERE TODAY TO DEAL WITH THE ADOPTION, THAT'S SOMETHING 
22 TOTALLY SEPARATE. BUT I THINK TO TURN OVER THE ADOPTION 
23 BASED ON THE FRAUD WOULD BE REVERSEABLE ERROR BECAUSE THAT'S 
24 VERY CLEAR IN ALL THE CASES. FRAUD IS NOT IN AND OF ITSELF 
2 5 A BASIS TO SET ASIDE OR OVERTURN ANY ADOPTION. AND THAT 
IS --
2 I THE COURT: SO IT'S YOUR POSITION THAT SOMEBODY CAN 
3 VIOLATE ALL THE LAWS, GIVE NO NOTICE TO PEOPLE WHO NOTICE 
4 WAS INTENDED TO GO TO BY THE STATUTE, TERMINATE A PERSON'S 
5 RIGHTS IF THEY WERE THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER OF A CHILD AND 
6 JUST SMILE ABOUT IT AT THE END. 
7 MR. EDDINGTON: NO, THAT IS NOT OUR POSITION. BUT 
8 OUR POSITION IS THAT MISREPRESENTATIONS OR REPRESENTATIONS 
9 BY THE BIRTH MOTHER OR THE ADOPTIVE PARENTS IN AND OF 
10 THEMSELVES ARE NOT JUSTIFICATION TO OVERTURN ADOPTION. 
11 THE COURT: WELL, I GUESS THE QUESTION I'VE GOT IS 
12 IF THE EVIDENCE WILL SUPPORT WHAT YOU SAY ABOUT WHEN THE 
13 CHILD WAS PLACED AND THAT EVIDENCE THAT WAS GIVEN TO THE 
14 JUDGE TO DO THAT SHOWED THAT THE CHILD HAD BEEN PLACED WHEN 
15 IT WAS LESS THAN SIX MONTHS OLD, THEN I SUPPOSE YOU CAN DO 
16 THAT TODAY; IS THAT CORRECT? 
17 MR. EDDINGTON: YES. 
18 THE COURT: OKAY. WHAT ELSE DO YOU HAVE. 
19 MR. EDDINGTON: WELL, I GUESS THAT'S ALL. I WAS 
20 SEEKING GUIDANCE. COUNSEL AND I SPOKE ABOUT THIS LAST WEEK. 
21 I THINK OUR UNDERSTANDING IS STILL QUITE DIFFERENT. MY 
22 POSITION IS THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH THE ADOPTION STATUTE. 
23 SINCE THE COURT HAS ALREADY CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED IF WE ARE 
24 DEALING WITH THOSE TODAY, THEN I THINK THAT'S APPROPRIATE, 
25 BUT THE PETITIONER HAS NO STANDING. IF WE'RE DEALING WITH 
1 THE FRAUD, HE CERTAINLY DOES HAVE A STANDING TO SUE AND 
2 THAT'S A TOTALLY DIFFERENT ISSUE AND HE DOES HAVE THE RIGHT 
3 TO PROCEED SIMPLY ON THE FRAUD. BUT THAT IS NOT A BASIS, AS 
4 WAS INDICATED BEFORE, TO OVERTURN THE ADOPTION. SO I GUESS 
5 THAT'S WHERE I WAS --
6 THE COURT: I'M NOT FOLLOWING YOU. YOU SAY HE HAS 
7 THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRING A CIVIL ACTION FOR FRAUD. WHAT IS 
8 HIS REMEDY UNDER YOUR THEORY. 
9 MR. EDDINGTON: FINANCIAL. FINANCIAL AWARDS. 
10 WHATEVER HIS DAMAGES ARE THAT HE CAN ESTABLISH. AND THAT 
11 RIGHT IS PRESERVED BY THE STATUTE, IF IN FACT HE CAN PREVAIL 
12 THERE. BUT --
13 THE COURT: SO UNDER YOUR THEORY HE CAN SUE FOR 
14 FRAUD AND GET FINANCIAL --HE CAN GET MONEY DAMAGES FOR THE 
15 FRAUD THAT TERMINATED HIS RIGHT AS A BIOLOGICAL FATHER. 
16 MR. EDDINGTON: UH-HUH. 
17 THE COURT: AND WHAT'S THE VALUE OF THAT. 
18 MR. EDDINGTON: WELL, THAT'S JUST WHAT'S PRESERVED 
19 IN THE STATUTE. 
20 THE COURT: OKAY. 
21 MR. EDDINGTON: I GUESS THAT'S MY OPENING STATEMENT 
22 OR MY POSITION IS THAT FIRST OF ALL HE HAS NO STANDING TO 
23 SUE BASED ON THE STATUTE. WE CAN ESTABLISH THAT THROUGH OUR 
24 CASE TODAY. AND I THINK WE CAN IDENTIFY AS WE GO THROUGH 
25 DATES AND TIMES AND THOSE SORTS OF THINGS. I WANTED TO BE 
1 CLEAR WHETHER WE'RE PROCEEDING ON THE -- PROCEEDING CIVILLY 
2 ON THE FRAUD OR WHETHER WE'RE DEALING WITH THE ADOPTION 
3 STATUTE ON THE ADOPTION ITSELF. 
4 THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW ANY MORE THAN WHAT THE 
5 PARTIES HAVE DONE IN THEIR PLEADINGS WHAT WE ARE PROCEEDING 
6 ON. NOBODY'S CLARIFIED IT ANY MORE THAN WHAT'S IN THE 
7 PLEADINGS. 
8 MR. EDDINGTON: ALL RIGHT. WE'LL PROCEED I GUESS 
9 AS THE COURT DIRECTS AND GO THAT DIRECTION. 
10 THE COURT: OKAY THEN. MR. LUDLOW, DO YOU WANT TO 
11 CALL YOUR FIRST WITNESS. 
12 MR. LUDLOW: I CALL THE PETITIONER, YOUR HONOR. 
13 THE COURT: IF YOU'LL COME FORWARD AND BE SWORN. 
14 TIMOTHY DANIEL SANCHEZ 
15 CALLED BY THE PLAINTIFF, HAVING BEEN DULY 
16 SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
17 
18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
19 BY MR. LUDLOW: 
2 0 Q SIR, WOULD YOU PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS? 
21 A TIMOTHY DANIEL SANCHEZ, AND I LIVE AT 105 WEST GORDON 
22 AVENUE, LAYTON. 
23 Q SIR, IS THAT LOCATED IN DAVIS COUNTY? 
24 A YES. 
2 5 Q SIR, ARE YOU --DO YOU KNOW LAURA FLUHMAN? 
1 A YES. 
2 Q WHAT HAPPENED ON FEBRUARY 14? 
3 A WHILE, I WAS TRYING TO MAKE PLANS WITH LAURA IF I COULD 
4 TAKE SIDNEY FOR MY BIRTHDAY, YOU KNOW, 'CAUSE MY BIRTHDAY 
5 WAS COMING UP AT THAT TIME. AND SHE WAS TELLING ME THAT, 
6 YOU KNOW, IT MIGHT BE A POSSIBILITY. WE'LL SEE WHAT 
7 HAPPENS WHEN IT COMES AROUND. THEN ON THE 14TH -- AND THEY 
8 CAME. THEY -- LAURA GIVE ME A CALL. AND THAT'S WHEN THEY 
9 TOLD ME, LET'S SEE. YEAH. THAT'S WHEN THEY GAVE ME A CALL 
10 AND TOLD ME THAT THEY HAD ADOPTED SIDNEY. SHE ADOPTED 
11 SIDNEY TO HER MOM. 
12 Q NOW, LAURA AND HER MOTHER LIVED IN THE SAME HOUSE, DON'T 
13 THEY? 
14 A YES. 
15 Q NOW, PRIOR TO THIS TIME WERE YOU GIVEN ANY NOTICE OF 
16 THAT THERE WAS GOING TO BE AN ADOPTION? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q WERE YOU EVER TOLD THAT THEY WERE PLANNING ON DOING 
19 ADOPTION? 
20 A NO. 
21 Q HAD THEY EVER SAID ANYTHING TO YOU ABOUT WE WERE GOING 
22 TO HAVE PAIGE ADOPT --BY PAIGE, LAURA'S MOTHER -- ADOPT 
23 SIDNEY? 
24 A NO". 
25 Q HAD THERE BEEN REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO YOU BY LAURA 
1 TIME SHE'D WANT THAT PERSON TO BE THE FATHER FIGURE IN 
2 SIDNEY'S LIFE. 
3 Q SHE'S NOT BECOME MARRIED DURING ANY TIME PERIOD --
4 A NO. 
5 Q --WE'RE INVOLVED IN, HAS SHE? 
6 A NO. 
7 MR. LUDLOW: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR HONOR. 
8 THANK YOU. 
9 THE COURT: MR. EDDINGTON. 
10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
11 BY MR. EDDINGTON: 
12 Q TIM, LET'S BACK UP A LITTLE BIT. WHAT WAS YOUR MARITAL 
13 STATUS AT THE TIME OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE CHILD? 
14 A I WAS MARRIED. 
15 Q WHAT WAS YOUR STATUS AT THE TIME OF THE BIRTH OF THE 
16 CHILD? 
17 A I THINK I WAS STILL MARRIED AT THAT TIME. I DON'T 
18 REMEMBER WHEN THE DIVORCE WENT THROUGH. YEAH. I WAS STILL 
19 MARRIED. 
20 Q SO ISN'T IT MORE ACCURATE TO SAY THEN THAT YOUR WIFE WAS 
21 THE ONE THAT NOTIFIED YOU OF THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD, NOT 
22 YOUR EX-WIFE? 
23 A YES. 
24 Q PRIOR TO THE BIRTH OF THE CHILD WERE THERE ANY 
25 REPRESENTATIONS TO YOU BY LAURA THAT SHE WOULD LIVE WITH 
1 YOU? 
2 A NO. 
3 Q OR THAT SHE WOULD MARRY YOU ? 
4 A NO. 
5 Q OR THAT YOU TWO WOULD RAISE THE CHILD TOGETHER AS IN 
6 THE HOME? 
7 A NO. 
8 Q PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE DID YOU EVER AT ANY TIME HAVE 
9 CONCERNS ABOUT HOW YOU WOULD ESTABLISH YOUR RIGHTS AS A 
10 FATHER? 
11 A PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE? 
12 Q I'M SORRY. PRIOR TO THE BIRTH. 
13 THE COURT: WOULD YOU REPEAT THAT QUESTION. 
14 Q (BY MR. EDDINGTON) PRIOR TO THE BIRTH OF THE 
15 CHILD, DID YOU HAVE ANY THOUGHTS OR CONCERNS ABOUT HOW YOU 
16 WOULD ESTABLISH YOUR RIGHTS AS A FATHER? 
17 A YEAH, I WOULD SAY YEAH, I GUESS SO. 
18 Q DID YOU EVER DO ANYTHING ABOUT THEM? 
19 A YEAH. 
20 Q WHAT DID YOU DO AND WHEN? 
21 A I DID EVERYTHING THAT I BELIEVED OF THAT I WAS SUPPOSED 
22 TO. HELP SUPPORT. ASK THEM -- GET THE CHILD WHAT THE CHILD 
23 NEEDS, YOU KNOW. 
24 Q SO YOU EZLIEVED BUYING ITEMS FOR THE CHILD WOULD 
25 PROTECT YOUR RIGHTS? 
1 A YEAH. I DIDN'T KNOW THAT THERE WAS A RIGHT THAT I HAD 
2 TO SIGN A PAPER. TO ME A FATHER'S A FATHER. I DIDN'T HAVE 
3 TO DO IT WITH MY OTHER TWO CHILDREN SO, YOU KNOW, I WAS 
4 DOING EVERYTHING THAT I WAS SUPPOSED TO THAT I BELIEVED A 
5 FATHER WAS SUPPOSED TO DO. 
6 Q WHAT TIME DURING THE PREGNANCY WERE YOU AWARE THAT THEY 
7 WERE NOT GOING TO PUT YOUR NAME ON THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE. 
8 A EARLY ON IN THE PREGNANCY. I DON'T KNOW HOW FAR ALONG 
9 SHE WAS. 
10 Q DID THAT EVER CHANGE? DID SHE EVER SAY AT ANY TIME 
11 DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE PREGNANCY THAT YOU WOULD BE PUT 
12 ON THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE? 
13 A NO. 
14 Q DID THAT CONCERN YOU ? 
15 A YEAH, IT DID, AND I LET HER KNOW THAT -- I TOLD HER THAT 
16 I WANTED THE CHILD TO HAVE MY LAST NAME. 
17 Q DID YOU EVER SEEK FOR ANY ADVICE ON HOW TO ESTABLISH 
18 THAT? 
19 A NO, BECAUSE THEY HAD TOLD ME THAT THEY WERE DOING IT FOR 
2 0 BASICALLY LIKE MEDICAL PURPOSES SO THEY CAN HAVE THE MEDICAL 
21 BILLS PAID AND STUFF. AND IF MY NAME WAS ON THE BIRTH 
22 CERTIFICATE THAT THEY WOULDN'T PAY FOR THOSE AND I 
23 UNDERSTOOD THAT. 
24 Q HAVE YOU EVER HEARD OF PATERNITY ACTION? 
25 A NOT UNTIL AFTER I STARTED CHECKING UP TO FIND OUT WHAT 
1 WEEKEND. A WEEK OR SO, I GUESS. I'M NOT TOTALLY POSITIVE 
2 "CAUSE I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE DATES ARE ALL AT THAT TIME. 
3 Q YOU KNEW AT THAT TIME THAT YOU WERE NOT LISTED ON THE 
4 BIRTH CERTIFICATE? 
5 A YES. 
6 Q AND YOU HAD NO ANTICIPATION THAT LAURA WOULD EVER MOVE 
7 IN WITH YOU? 
8 A YES. 
9 Q HAVE YOU EVER FILED A NOTICE OF PATERNITY? 
10 A NO". I WENT TO GO TO CHECK ON ONE. 
11 Q WHEN WAS THAT? 
12 A IT WAS -- WHAT DATE WAS THAT. WHENEVER THE FIRST -- I 
13 CAN'T EVEN REMEMBER THE DATE. WHEN THE FIRST TRIAL WE HAD 
14 HERE. AFTER THAT I WENT TO GO CHECK OUT WHAT THE PATERNITY 
15 PAPERS WERE ABOUT AND THEY HAD THEY HAD TOLD ME THAT AFTER A 
16 BABY HAS BEEN ADOPTED YOU CAN'T SIGN PATERNITY PAPERS. 
17 Q THAT WAS A MONTH OR TWO AGO? 
18 A YEAH. 
19 Q HAVE YOU EVER FILED A PATERNITY ACTION? 
20 A NO. 
21 Q DID YOU EVER ATTEMPT TO DO THAT OR LOOK INTO THAT? 
22 A YEAH, I DID, AFTER THE ADOPTION HAD ALREADY TAKEN PLACE. 
23 NEVER BEFORE 'CAUSE I DIDN'T KNOW I HAD TO. 
24 Q WHAT MADE YOU THINK OF IT AT THAT TIME? 
2 5 A BECAUSE PEOPLE LIKE SOME OF THE LAWYERS THAT I CALLED 
^ AAl 
1 THAT TIME PERIOD. THAT'S WHEN DOES THE ADOPTION COMES TO 
2 FRUITION. I CONSIDER IT INTERESTING THAT SHE, ON THE 
3 DOCUMENTS THAT SHE FILED AND ALSO THAT WERE FILED ON THE 
4 PETITION, BOTH OF THEM SAY AN UNKNOWN FATHER. AND THAT'S 
5 JUST FLAT OUT UNTRUE. BOTH THESE PEOPLE KNOW WHO THE FATHER 
6 WAS. 
7 THE COURT: WELL, AND I UNDERSTAND WHAT THE STATUTE 
8 SAYS. I THINK THE BETTER THING THERE IS IS THE MOTHER OF 
9 THE CHILD SAYING HER CONSENT WAS NOT TO CUT TIM OFF. WELL, 
10 IT DID. 
11 MR. LUDLOW: IT DID. 
12 THE COURT: THAT WASN'T HER INTENT, YOU KNOW. I 
13 MEAN, MY QUESTION IS WHY DON'T THEY LET ANYBODY KNOW. IT 
14 WASN'T THAT HE WAS GOING TO GET CUSTODY OF THE CHILD. YOU 
15 KNOW, IF HE WAS GIVEN NOTICE OF THE ADOPTION, HE WAS GOING 
16 TO ARGUE FOR WHAT HE'S ARGUING NOW AND THAT IS THE CHANCE TO 
17 HAVE VISITATION. 
18 MR. LUDLOW: THAT IS ALL HE'S ARGUING, SIR. 
19 THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. WHAT IF THAT DOESN'T 
2 0 HAPPEN AND YOU SAY, OKAY. I FIND YOU DON'T MEET THE 
21 STANDARDS, THEN WHAT ARE YOU SAYING ABOUT THE OTHER CLAIMS 
22 ABOUT DAMAGES FOR WHAT THESE PEOPLE HAVE DONE. 
23 MR. LUDLOW: THE STATUTE DOES SPECIFICALLY ALLOW 
24 FOR AN ACTION TO BE MAINTAINED EVEN IF IT'S BEEN WRONGFULLY 
25 DONE BY THEM. THE COURT CAN AWARD MONEY DAMAGES. OUR 
1 POSITION IS THAT EVEN IF -- THAT IS NOT THE RIGHT THING TO 
2 DO IN THIS CASE BECAUSE LAURA IS UNEMPLOYED, ALWAYS WILL BE. 
3 THE ITEM THAT IS TO BE DONE HERE IS ALLOW MR. SANCHEZ TO 
4 HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS CHILD. THAT IS THE APPROPRIATE 
5 THING HERE. THE COURT DENIES THAT, YOU DO HAVE THE RIGHT 
6 TO LOOK AT AND SAY I CAN AWARD MONEY DEMAGES BECAUSE OF 
7 THESE VARIOUS ITEMS THAT HAS OCCURRED HERE. BUT I THINK 
8 THAT'S HOLLOW. IT TRULY IS HOLLOW, YOUR HONOR. 
9 YOUR HONOR, YOU KNOW, THE COURT READ OUR PREVIOUS 
10 MEMORANDUM THAT I HAVE FILED. IT TALKS ABOUT THE ITEMS 
11 DEALING WITH FAILURES IN DUE PROCESS ISSUES AND INTERPRETING 
12 OF THE STATUTE. 
13 THE COURT: I THINK IF HE COMPLIES WITH 2 (A), YOU 
14 KNOW, HE WAS TO BE GIVEN --HE HAD TO HAVE HIS CONSENT FOR 
15 THE ADOPTION AND HELD TO -- HAVE BEEN GIVEN NOTICE. IF YOU 
16 GET PAST 2 (A) 
17 MR. LUDLOW: YOU OUR POSITION IS WE HAVE. 
18 THE COURT: -- BASICALLY WHERE YOU WANT TO BE. 
19 MR. LUDLOW: YES. THAT'S WHY WE BELIEVE OUR 
20 POSITION IS WE HAVE REACHED THAT. YOUR HONOR, LOOKING AT 
21 THOUGH IT'S A HOLDER OF THE CASES AND IT'S IN THAT 
22 CONCURRING OPINION FROM JUSTICE JACKSON IN KBENTME AT 740 
23 P.2D 292. THIS IS UNDER THE OLD LAW. HIS CONCURRING PIN 
24 WAS THAT THE CHILD HAD TO HAVE BEEN PLACED FOR ADOPTION 
25 BECAUSE THERE HADN'T BEEN ANY RELEASE OF PHYSICAL CONTROL 
ZZ6 
1 UNLESS THE FATHER WASN NECESSARY TO BE CONTACTED IN ORDER 
2 FOR THE ADOPTION TO OCCUR. AND I THINK THAT CASE HAS THE 
3 SAME THINGS AND ELEMENTS. WHEN YOU TALK ABOUT WHAT'S 
4 HAPPENING IN THIS CHILD, THE CHILD STILL BEING THERE NEVER 
5 HAVING LITERALLY BEEN RELINQUISHED. AND TOPPING THAT OFF 
6 WITH WHAT WE BELIEVE THAT THE PETITIONER HAS IN FACT 
7 ESTABLISHED A RELATIONSHIP AND DONE SO IN THE CONFINES OF 
8 WHAT HAS BEEN REQUESTED. THAT THE COURT SHOULD IN FACT SETD 
9 ASIDE THE ADOPTION AND ALLOW HIM TO BE DEEMED AS BEING THE 
10 FATHER AND GIVE HIM HIS VISITATION FOR THIS CHILD AND HE'LL 
11 PAY THE SUPPORT. THAT'S TRULY WHAT WE WANT. 
12 THE COURT: WELL, LET'S HEAR FROM THE OTHER SIDE 
13 THEN YOU'LL GET YOUR LAST OPPORTUNITY. 
14 MR. EDDINGTON: YOUR HONOR, AGAIN, WE RESPECTFULLY 
15 REPEAT THAT WE SHOULDN'T BE HERE. 
16 THE COURT: WELL, YOU KNOW WHAT? IF WE SHOULDN'T 
17 HAVE BEEN I'VE SURE WASTED ABOUT FROM 8:30 TILL FOUR TODAY 
18 AND ALL MY LUNCH DOING NOTHING BUT READING THIS STUFF. AND 
19 YOU KNOW, NOT BEING ABLE TO EVEN ENJOY MY TWO PIECEES OF 
20 BREAD I HAD TO EAT. 
21 MR. EDDINGTON: I UNDERSTAND THAT. I'M SURE THAT 
22 THE PARTIES AREN'T NECESSARILY THRILLED EITHER. BUT MY 
23 WHOLE POINT, I BELIEVE THAT THE ADOPTION WAS GRANTED IN 
24 FEBRUARY OF '98. 
2 5 THE COURT: THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. YOU 
1 MR. EDDINGTON: I'M NOT SAYING THAT THAT IS. LET 
2 ME ADDRESS THAT BECAUSE THAT'S OBVIOUSLY A CONCERN THE COURT 
3 HAS. 
4 THE COURT: I'VE GOT A BIG CONCERN. THE ONE 
5 CONCERN IS I HAVE A BIOLOGICAL FATHER WHO COMES IN HERE AND 
6 I HAVE CASE AFTER CASE WHERE PEOPLE DON'T WANT TO PAY CHILD 
7 SUPPORT. NOW I HAVE SOMEONE VOLUNTEERINGING TO DO SO. I 
8 HAVE SOMEONE WHO'S SAYING, IF I DON'T GIVE YOU WHAT YOU ASK 
9 FOR, WHAT ABOUT MONEY AND THEY SAY THEY DON'T WANT MONEY. 
10 YOU KNOW, THAT'S RARE THINGS THAT I'VE HEARD. AND IF IT'S 
11 STRATEGY, IT'S A GOOD ONE. BECAUSE IT'S RARE. SO WHAT I 
12 HAVE HERE IS SOMEONE SAYING THAT I DON'T WANT TO CUT OFF, 
13 YOU KNOW, THE RIGHTS OF TIM, BUT YOU KNOW, WHAT WE'RE 
14 GOING TO DO IS KEEP HIM IN THE DARK; NOT LET HIM KNOW ABOUT 
15 IT. AND THEN AFTER THE FACT SAY, WE GOT AN ADOPTION. I 
16 MEAN, THAT'S BASICALLY WHAT I'M FACED WITH. ESPECIALLY 
17 AFTER SOMETHING WAS FILED IN APRIL OF '97 THEN MOVED HERE IN 
18 JANUARY OR FEBRUARY '98. THEN SOMEBODY WHO WAS LOOKING AT 
19 THIS SHOULD HAVE THEN SAID, WHEW, NOW WE'RE HERE IN JANUARY 
20 OF '98. MAYBE WE'RE GOING TO BE UNDER THE CHILD OVER TEN 
21 MONTHS RULE OR CHILD OVER SIX MONTHS. SHE'S NOW TEN. THEN, 
22 ARE WE GOING TO BE ABLE TO PROVE THIS OR NOT. ARE WE GOING 
23 TO MAKE A CALCULATED RISK THAT WE CAN PROVE THIS AND WE'RE 
24 NOT GOING TO TELL HIM ANYTHING AND THEN I CAN BRING THIS UP 
2 5 LATER AND CHALLENGE IT AND WE'LL SEE IF WE CAN DEFEAT IT. 
1 THE CHILD'S FUTURE, THE NEAR FUTURE, AS OPPOSED TO GETTING 
2 MARRIED IN 20 YEARS. ALSO I THINK HE'S DEMONSTRATED A FULL 
3 COMMITMENT TO THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARENTHOOD BY 
4 FINANCIAL SUPPORT. I DON'T KNOW IF WHAT HE'S PAID IN THE 
5 MONTHS WAS WHAT'S AUTHORIZED BY THE STATUTE. BUT YOU KNOW, 
6 HE OFFERED IT. HE WAS WILLING TO OFFER MORE. I MEAN, FOR A 
7 LONGER PERIOD OF TIME AND WAS PREVENTED FROM DOING SO. 
8 I FIND THAT THERE'S -- WHAT I'VE ALREADY SAID THAT HE 
9 VISITED THE CHILD AT LEAST MONTHLY UNDER THE SUBSECTION 
10 LARGE (A). SO GETTING TO THAT POINT THEN, I FIND THAT HE 
11 COMPLIED WITH 78-30-4.14 AND THEREFORE HIS CONSENT WAS 
12 NECESSARY TO THE ADOPTION. UNDER 78-30-4.13 (2) PARENTHESIS 
13 (A). HE WAS NOT ENTITLED --HE WAS ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
14 NOTICE OF THE ADOPTION AND HE WASN'T GIVEN NOTICE OF THE 
15 ADOPTION. IN LOOKING AT SOME OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
16 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE PETITIONERS, I THINK GENERALLY IF 
17 YOU HAVE THEM THERE, I'M NOT GOING TO READ THEM ALL. I'M 
18 GOING TO STAY WHAT I THINK IS CONSIST TKEPTD WITH WHAT I'VE 
19 SAID SO FAR. I THINK FINDINGS OF FACT ONE, TWO, THREE, 
20 FOUR -- WELL, FOUR THROUGH -- BASICALLY FOUR THROUGH 20 IN 
21 SUBSTANCE, I THINK ARE AGREEABLE. NOT NECESSARILY GOING TO 
22 AGREE WITH NUMBER 21. I THINK WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT HE WAS 
23 NOT ALLOWED -- THE FINDINGS I'VE MADE REGARDING THE 
24 STATUTE IS THAT HE DID WHAT HE WAS ALLOWED TO DO BY THE 
25 ADOPTIVE GRANDMOTHER IN THIS CASE AND THE BIOLOGICAL MOTHER. 
